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Is Doing Good Good for You? 
Yes, Charitable Contributions Enhance Revenue Growth 
 
Abstract 
 
A key question concerning socially responsible corporate activities is whether such actions 
achieve traditional goals, such as profit maximization and shareholder value creation, or whether 
such activities represent a drain on resources by opportunistic managers.  Much of the debate 
about the legitimacy of and justification for socially responsible activities would be settled if it is 
convincingly shown that they further traditional business goals.  In this study we provide such 
evidence.  Using a large sample of charitable contributions made by public companies from 1989 
through 2000, and a statistical methodology that distinguishes causation from association, we 
document that charitable contributions enhance the future revenue growth of the donors. In 
particular, we find evidence that, for firms in industries that are highly sensitive to consumer 
perception, corporate giving is associated with subsequent sales growth. On the other hand, our 
results do not provide strong evidence that revenue growth drives future charitable giving. 
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Is Doing Good Good for You?  
Yes, Charitable Contributions Enhance Revenue Growth 
 
I. Introduction 
 
 Corporations in the United States contributed close to $14 billion to charity in 2005, 
almost double the amount contributed just a decade earlier (Giving USA, 2006).  Despite this 
substantial growth, corporate giving remains controversial.  The main question: Should business 
enterprises engage in socially responsible activities, such as supporting the arts, helping the poor, 
fighting diseases, and protecting the environment; or should business enterprises focus on 
maximizing profits and shareholder value, leaving the good deeds to individual shareholders and 
other stakeholders?  The debate over corporate social responsibility (“CSR”) is as old as 
corporate involvement in such activities (e.g., Berle, 1931 and Dodd, 1932) and is far from 
resolution or convergence of opinions, as evidenced by the ever-growing number of newspaper 
articles, scientific papers, and conferences on CSR. 
 Surely, questions concerning the legitimacy of CSR are moot if such activity furthers the 
traditional objectives of business enterprises: profit maximization and the creation of shareholder 
value (Levitt, 1958; Friedman, 1970). In fact, proponents of CSR argue that most social 
initiatives do make economic sense by, for example, increasing customer loyalty and brand 
awareness, improving employee retention and productivity, or reducing litigation risk.  However, 
critics believe that corporate social initiatives are a drain on shareholder wealth and a distraction 
of managers’ attention in endeavors where they have no particular expertise. Thus, if it is 
convincingly shown, for example, that corporate charitable contributions increase revenue (by 
more than the contributions, of course), then such evidence placates the critics’ concerns about 
corporate philanthropy.  In such cases, corporate contributions are as justified as research and 
development (R&D), capital expenditures, or marketing campaigns. 
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 Indeed, much research on CSR strives to establish empirically a business case for socially 
responsible activities. Margolis and Walsh (2001) report that since 1972 there have been 95 
studies investigating the link between social performance and financial performance. These 
studies use a wide variety of measures of CSR, including environmental disclosures and 
practices (e.g., Blacconiere and Patten 1994; Russo and Fouts, 1997; Dowell, Hart and Yeung, 
2000), Fortune magazine’s corporate reputation survey (e.g., Herremans, Akathaporn and 
McInnes, 1993), divestment from South Africa (e.g., Patten, 1990; Teoh, Welch and Wazaan, 
1999), and Kinder, Lydenberg and Domini (“KLD”) ratings of social performance (e.g., 
Waddock and Graves, 1997a).  Results from this research generally indicate a positive 
association between CSR and economic performance (Roman, Hayibor and Agle, 1999; 
Margolis and Walsh, 2001; Orlitzky, Schmidt and Rynes, 2003). 
While clearly worthwhile and advancing the debate on CSR, most of the extant empirical 
work establishes an association between such activities and business goals.  But what about 
causation?  Perhaps the causation runs the other way—from economic performance to social 
performance.  There are three possible explanations for the documented positive association 
between social performance and economic performance. First, financially successful enterprises 
have greater means or economic slack (i.e., cash, highly priced stock) than less successful 
businesses have to engage in socially responsible activities.  Second, there is a genuine business 
case for socially responsible actions and CSR does indeed contribute to improved financial 
performance. Finally, neither drives the other, but the quality of management—a correlated 
variable—affects both social and economic performance (Waddock and Graves, 1997a).  Most 
CSR studies, while recognizing the causality issue, fail to resolve it.  The reason is simple:  
Establishing causality by statistical means is notoriously difficult, challenging researchers not 
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only in CSR but in other fields as well (e.g., the difficulties encountered in disentangling the 
effect of corporate investment (e.g., R&D) on sales or profitability). 
 In this study, we quantify the effect of corporate charitable contributions on the all 
important “top line”—annual revenues.  We do this by using a large sample of charitable 
contributions made by U.S. public companies from 1989 through 2000 and employing a widely 
used methodology—Granger causality—for investigating cause and effect.1  The methodology is 
simple, yet powerful.  If A causes B in a systematic manner, then A will be associated with 
future values of B, whereas B will not be associated with future values of A.  For example, if an 
increase in the highway speed limit causes an increase in the rate of car accidents, then a speed 
limit increase in time t should be significantly associated with car accident increases in periods t 
+ 1, t + 2, and thereafter.  In contrast, an observed increase in the accident rate in period t will 
not be associated with subsequent increases in speed limit. 
 In addition, we address the possibility that effective managers drive both social and 
financial performance. Specifically, it may be that successful managers have the ability to 
enhance both sales growth and charitable giving programs, satisfying several stakeholder groups 
simultaneously.  In this case, there will be an association between charitable contributions and 
sales growth, but the causal factor for both is managerial quality. We, therefore, include in our 
analysis a powerful indicator of managerial quality, termed by economists “organization capital.”  
This variable captures the unique contribution of a company’s systems, processes, and 
organizational designs—that is, its managerial quality—to its performance.  If managerial quality 
is the factor responsible for our findings, then by including it in the regression it will be 
statistically significant, while charitable contributions will cease to be so. 
                                                 
1 Dowell, Hart and Yeung (2000) are probably the first to use this methodology in the CSR literature.  They examine 
the relationship between a firm’s environmental standards and Tobin’s q.   However, they do not find any evidence 
that a firm’s current environmental standards are a significant predictor of future firm value. 
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 We test cross-sectionally whether annual changes in corporate contributions are 
associated with subsequent changes in revenues (sales growth).  In addition to management 
quality, we control for the major contributors to revenue growth, in particular R&D, capital 
expenditures, and mergers and acquisitions, enabling us to focus on the incremental effect of 
charitable contributions on revenue growth. We also include the market-to-book ratio, a proxy 
for future growth expectations, to address the possibility that an association between giving and 
subsequent sales results from managers basing giving decisions on their forecasts of growth. 
 Our analysis documents that revenue growth in year t is significantly associated with the 
growth in charitable contributions in previous years, consistent with charitable contributions 
causing revenue increases.  Notably, when we perform the dual part of the Granger causality test 
(Granger, 1969)—regressing the growth in charitable contributions in year t on revenue growth 
in previous years, t – 1 and t – 2, the coefficients on revenue growth are marginally significant at 
best.  We, accordingly, do not find persuasive evidence that revenue growth substantially causes 
more corporate giving. 
 We further investigate the ability of corporate charitable contributions to enhance 
revenue by examining product market incentives to appear philanthropic. Contributions can 
improve brand awareness and the reputation of a company among customers as well as alleviate 
concerns about corporate misconduct. Firms that are more sensitive to public perception have 
greater incentives to appear charitable to increase demand for their products.  For example, 
contributions by Bank of America will be more effective in changing customer attitudes than 
contributions by Boeing, whose sales are to governments and corporations. Thus, we predict that 
consumer-oriented firms will most effectively use their philanthropy programs to boost sales.  To 
test this conjecture, we focus on sectors where the general public—the most sensitive audience to 
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corporate contributions—is the customer (e.g., consumer product manufacturers, retailers, and 
financial services).  When we perform our analysis on consumer-oriented industries, we find 
evidence consistent with a strong causal relationship between contributions and subsequent 
revenue growth, whereas for other industries the results are insignificant.  For firms sensitive to 
consumer perception, the estimated proportion of actual sales growth explained by gifts is 0.32% 
on average.2  In the second part of the Granger causality tests, for firms with high sensitivity to 
public perception, we find no evidence of an association between current sales and future 
contributions. For firms with low sensitivity to public perception, we report marginally 
significant results of an association between sales and subsequent charitable giving. 
 Summing up, the analysis we perform supports our conclusion that charitable 
contributions by U.S. companies enhance future revenue growth.  Doing good is apparently good 
for you.  A reassuring finding for CSR critics, which, we believe, is first documented here for 
charitable contributions in a comprehensive manner, and should be of considerable interest to 
managers, board members, investors, legislators, and the general public.  There are, of course, 
important issues left for future research, including whether firms choose the optimal level of 
giving to maximize profits and whether corporate charitable contributions actually do improve 
social welfare. Nevertheless, we believe that our findings, as well as the statistical methodology 
underlying them, advance the discourse on CSR. 
 Section II of the paper discusses corporate philanthropy and the link between corporate 
philanthropy and sales. Section III describes the data and our methodology, and presents results 
of the tests of the effect of corporate giving on future sales. Section IV concludes the paper. 
                                                 
2 For each observation, we first compute the contribution of GIFT to sales growth as the difference between the 
predicted sales growth using the actual lagged growth in gifts and the predicted sales growth with zero growth in 
gifts. The actual value of all explanatory variables other than GIFT is used to derive the predicted sales growths. The 
mean contribution of GIFT to sales growth divided by the actual sales growth is the proportion of actual sales 
growth explained by gifts. 
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II. Background on Corporate Charitable Giving 
A Brief History of Corporate Philanthropy 
 Differing presumptions about the actual motives for corporation philanthropy have led to 
over 100 years of debate in the United States concerning the legitimacy of corporate giving. 
Initially, contributions were legally permissible only if they provided a direct and immediate 
benefit to the firm (Filbey, 1931). For example, railroads were a major corporate donor in the 
late 19th century.  The railroads’ gifts resulted from pure self-interest, as they gave to YMCAs 
along the tracks that supplied their workers with an economical place to sleep (Muirhead, 1999). 
 In 1919, 1928, and 1934, Congress considered but did not approve a corporate tax 
deduction for charitable giving. Because corporations are organized under state, not federal, law, 
Congress did not want to encourage behavior that was not explicitly permitted in most states 
(Knauer, 1995). After protracted debate, Congress approved a tax deduction for corporate 
philanthropy during the Great Depression. The Revenue Act of 1935 allowed corporations to 
deduct charitable contributions up to 5% of pre-tax income.  The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 
1981 raised the limit to 10%, where it remains currently. 
 Even with beneficial federal tax treatment, corporate philanthropy remained ultra vires, 
or beyond the explicit powers accorded to management, in many states under the philosophy that 
managers could not give away shareholder money without shareholder approval (Knauer, 1995). 
Thus, corporate giving was limited until the 1953 landmark case A.P. Smith Manufacturing Co. 
v. Barlow, when the New Jersey Supreme Court allowed the company to donate $1,500 to 
Princeton University, giving managers power to make charitable contributions regardless of 
stockholders’ direct interests.  The court reasoned that corporate philanthropy improves the 
economic and social environment in which the corporation operates and, therefore, provides an 
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indirect or long-term benefit to the company (Knauer, 1995).  The Delaware courts upheld this 
view of corporate philanthropy in the Theodora Holding Co. v. Henderson case in 1969. These 
cases opened the door for business support of a large variety of charitable causes and resulted in 
a dramatic increase in corporate philanthropy (Yankey, 1996). 
Every state now has a statute allowing companies to make charitable contributions.  
These statutes generally do not limit the amount of the contributions or the recipients (Balotti 
and Hanks, 1999). Even though the practice of corporate philanthropy is prevalent today, debate 
over its legitimacy continues. While versions of recent corporate tax legislation (e.g., the CARE 
Act of 2002) included proposals enhancing tax incentives for charitable giving, presumably to 
encourage more corporate philanthropy, versions of other legislation (e.g., House Resolutions 
944 and 945 in 1997, early versions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, and a Senate Finance 
Committee proposal in 2004) sought to place further controls over corporate philanthropy under 
the assumption that managers make self-aggrandizing giving decisions.  While none of these 
proposals eventually passed, the contradictory grounds on which they were based demonstrate 
the need for further understanding of corporate philanthropy and its consequences. 
Link Between Corporate Philanthropy and Sales 
Today, a wide variety of causes and organizations benefit from corporate giving. Most 
firms spend the largest fraction of their contributions budget on education.  Not surprising, health 
and humans services organizations are the major beneficiaries of contributions from 
pharmaceutical companies.  Arts and cultural, environmental, international, and community and 
civic causes also receive corporate support.  This support includes both cash and noncash 
contributions, such as inventory, land, stock, and employee time. Firms can give funds directly to 
a charitable cause or through corporate-sponsored foundations (Petrovits, 2006). 
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Corporate philanthropy can maximize shareholder value by boosting sales, raising 
employee morale and productivity (Navarro, 1988; Greening and Turban, 2000), stimulating 
innovation, or improving relations with government regulators and special interest groups 
(Barron, 2001; Neiheisel, 1994). Critics of corporate philanthropy have argued that corporate 
giving is a managerial perquisite; managers make contribution decisions to further their own 
objectives and community status (Balotti and Hanks, 1999), and contributions are thus just an 
agency cost (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Useem and Kutner (1984), Galaskiewicz (1997), 
Boatsman and Gupta (1996), and Brown, Helland and Smith (2006) present evidence consistent 
with the CEO and board wielding substantial influence over the firms’ giving decisions.3  
Interestingly, one fact is often overlooked in discussions of the motivations for corporate giving: 
The profit maximization motive and the managerial opportunism motive are not mutually 
exclusive. For example, a contribution could help a corporate manager attain a higher social 
status while simultaneously enhancing the firm’s reputation among consumers. 
In this study, we focus on the first possible reason why managers devote corporate 
resources to charitable causes—to enhance revenue. Contributions can increase the firm’s name 
recognition among consumers in a similar manner to advertising (e.g., Coke’s sponsorship of 
Olympic teams).  Corporate giving can also enhance a company’s long-term reputation, which 
increases customer retention and reduces the price elasticity of demand (e.g., Ben and Jerry’s).4  
Philanthropy programs can also be established to increase demand in the short-run (e.g., cause-
                                                 
3 A third possible motive is that corporate contributions are altruistic, providing no benefit to the firm’s stockholders 
or its managers.  Either managers may be altruistic or individual investors may be altruistic. In the case of individual 
investors, they could choose to give via the firm because of possible tax benefits. Corporate contributions are tax 
deductible while dividends are not deductible so using the firm as an intermediary could increase the overall amount 
of giving.  Theoretically, for the altruistic motive not to unravel, virtually all investors must be altruistic. There is 
little empirical support for a purely altruistic motive. 
4 According to a 2000 survey conducted by Walker Information and the Council on Foundations 
(http://www.cof.org), among customers who rate a firm’s philanthropy as high, 94.9% (87.4%) say they will 
continue doing business with (recommend) the company.  Among customers who rate a firm’s philanthropy as low, 
only 66.6% (56.1%) say they will continue doing business with (recommend) the company. 
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related marketing, such as Avon’s pink ribbon products, where a portion of each sale goes to 
Avon’s Breast Cancer Crusade), and in the long-run (e.g.,  publishing company McGraw Hill 
funds literacy programs that ultimately increase its consumer base). Finally, firms can hope to 
improve conditions internationally with the long-term goal of enhancing the size and quality of 
potential new markets. 
Woods and Jones (1995) argue that researchers should expect a positive association 
between social performance and financial performance only when there is a theoretical link 
between the two measures. We use sales as our construct of economic performance because, as 
discussed above, there is a clear connection between contributions and revenues.  In addition, 
Margolis and Walsh (2001) note that in studies of the relation between social and economic 
performance the inclusion of control variables has been ad hoc with little consideration given to 
other factors that affect financial performance. However, a large body of literature exists on the 
determinants of sales, and we include these other determinants as controls in our analysis in 
order to isolate the effect of charitable giving. 
Prior research on corporate contributions primarily focuses on identifying the 
determinants of the level of giving (Clotfelter, 1985) and offers only indirect evidence of a link 
between revenue growth and corporate contributions. For example, several studies find a positive 
association between advertising and corporate giving (Schwartz, 1968; Fry, Keim and Meiners, 
1982; Navarro, 1988; Boatsman and Gupta, 1996). Johnson (1966) finds that firms in industries 
characterized by rivalry give more than firms in industries characterized by perfect competition 
or monopolistic firms, because rival firms can differentiate themselves whereas competitive 
firms can not afford to differentiate and monopolistic firms have no marketing reason to do so. In 
terms of reputation, Fombrun and Shanley (1990) show that corporate giving enhances a firm’s 
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reputation, and Williams and Barret (2000) report that, while a firm’s reputation is diminished by 
OSHA and EPA violations, the extent of decline is reduced by charitable giving. 
We use charitable contributions as our CSR construct because of the meaningful impact 
corporate philanthropy can have on social welfare. In addition, the prevalence of corporate 
giving in the United States allows us to examine a large cross-section of firms.  The dollar 
amounts given to charity are measurable, auditable, and comparable over time. Also, compared 
to other CSR initiatives, such as environmental investments, it is relatively easy for a firm to turn 
on or off the corporate spigot in a given year, which could give contributions more variability 
over time and potentially more power to the researcher to identify causality. The downside of 
using corporate philanthropy is that it represents only one dimension of CSR, so our results 
might not be generalizable. However, corporate contributions are an essential element in many 
firms’ social responsibility strategies, and, to the best of our knowledge, there is no prior 
research that examines the effect of philanthropy on economic performance in the 1990s.  There 
is some anecdotal evidence (Smith, 2000; Byrnes, 2005) that, over the past decade, corporate 
philanthropy programs have evolved such that firms now require congruence between their 
business objectives and their social objectives and will not invest in corporate giving unless it 
adds value. Thus, a large sample study of corporate contributions over this period that confirms 
or disproves the anecdotal evidence is relevant to wide audiences. 
 
III. Data, Empirical Models and Results 
Sample and Descriptive Statistics 
 We identify firms with corporate philanthropy programs using the Taft Group’s 
Corporate Giving Directory, which is published annually. The Taft profiles include the type of 
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giving (direct giving, foundation giving, or both) and some data on the amount of giving. These 
profiles are the primary source of direct corporate giving data.  For firms identified in Taft as 
having a corporate foundation, we collect foundation giving data from the National Center for 
Charitable Statistics (NCCS) Core Trend Private Foundation Data Extract. Thus, our measure of 
total giving equals direct giving, when available from Taft, as well as giving from the corporate 
foundation. Overall, data on charitable giving, termed GIFT, is obtained for the years 1989–
2000. We use estimated marginal tax rates from Graham (1996a, 1996b) and financial statement 
information from the COMPUSTAT annual database. We delete firms with less than seven years 
of charitable giving data so that we have sufficiently long time series for each firm to obtain 
reasonable estimates of Granger causality.5  The final sample consists of 1,618 observations for 
251 firms. 
 A few noteworthy points on the data are as follows: First, only firms that choose to report 
their direct giving to Taft are included in the sample, which could introduce sample selection 
bias; firms who choose to disclose direct giving might be the firms that can most effectively use 
charitable giving to enhance performance.  This concern is mitigated by the fact that our sample 
is composed of a wide variety of firms and the fact that all corporate foundation giving is 
disclosed via the foundation’s publicly available tax return. Also, to the extent that the 
effectiveness of charitable giving differs across the firms in the sample, our tests, even if using 
incomplete data, will capture the impact of charitable gifts on performance. Second, the Taft data 
is self-reported and thus is not based on a uniform definition. Different firms could have different 
definitions of charitable giving, e.g., one firm might classify an ad in a nonprofit magazine as a 
gift, while another classifies it as advertising. This introduces measurement errors that are not 
                                                 
5 Our estimation models require data on GIFT for three prior years. A firm is considered in the sample if four 
consecutive years of data are available. We require three such four consecutive years of data to be available so that 
we can estimate the panel data variance–covariance matrix for each firm-group. 
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likely to be systematic, but could lower the power of our tests. Third, some firms note that they 
report only charitable giving in the United States or giving at their headquarters.  To the extent 
that giving is decentralized, our corporate charitable contribution measure is understated. This 
could introduce noise in the charitable giving data. We mitigate this problem by examining the 
growth (change) in charitable giving. 
 Table 1, Panel A, provides the distribution of firms and firm-year observations across 
broad industries as defined by Sharpe (1982). Of the 251 sample firms, approximately two-thirds 
belong to three industries: 96 firms are in consumer goods, 39 firms are in capital goods, and 33 
are in financial institutions.  Table 1, Panel B, provides the year-wise distribution of the sample. 
All nine years are well-represented: from a low of 132 firms in 2000 to a high of 212 firms in 
1997. Overall, the sample consists of a variety of firms from different industries and across time. 
 Table 1, Panel C, provides descriptive statistics. The mean (median) revenue, SALE, is 
$8.9 ($3.6) billion, exhibiting a right skewed distribution; there are a few large firms and many 
that are small in terms of revenue. The mean (median) charitable giving, GIFT, is $8.93 ($1.99) 
million. On average, charitable giving represents about 0.1% of sales and 1.6% of net income. 
Values of GIFT range from a minimum of $3,000 for Thomas and Betts Corp. in 1995 to a 
maximum of $256.9 million for Merck in 1999.  Among the observations, 8% represent firms 
that use only direct charitable giving; 24% represent firms that use only foundations for 
charitable giving; 15% use both direct and foundations for charitable giving and disclose both; 
and 53% use both direct and foundations for charitable giving, but do not disclose direct giving. 
As such, for a large number of observations, GIFT is understated. 
 The mean (median) firm size as measured by market value is $14.6 billion ($4.0 billion). 
Firm sizes range from $25 million to $512 billion. Roughly 70% of the observations have 
 13
nonzero research and development expenditure suggesting that a large proportion of sample 
firms follow an innovation strategy.6  About 90% of firms have positive net income and spend on 
capital expenditures, consistent with the sample period coinciding with economic growth. 
Advertising expense is missing for 1,123 out of 1,618 observations.7 
Empirical Models 
 Our objective is to investigate the causal link between corporate philanthropy and 
economic performance. For this purpose, we examine (a) current sales, a prime measure of 
financial performance, as a function of prior charitable giving; and (b) current corporate 
charitable giving as a function of prior sales. Specifically, as a first step, we estimate the 
following equations by means of regressions: 
log(SALEit/SALEi(t–1)) = a0  + a1log(GIFTi(t–1)/GIFTi(t–2))  
+ a2log(GIFTi(t–2)/GIFTi(t–3)) + error  (1) 
 
log(GIFTit/GIFTi(t–1)) = a0 + b1log(SALEi(t–1)/SALEi(t–2))  
+ b2log(SALEi(t–2)/SALEi(t–3)) + error (2) 
  
where SALEit is firm i’s net revenue in year t (data item #12 on COMPUSTAT) and GIFTit is 
firm i’s charitable giving in year t. Because growth in sales and growth in giving are highly right-
skewed, we use a logarithmic functional form.  
 The intuition behind these specifications is based on the Granger causality test (Granger, 
1969): If corporate contributions cause sales, then we would expect past values of giving to help 
predict future sales, but we would not expect past values of sales to help predict future giving.  
While the intuition of the specifications in equations (1) and (2) is derived from Granger (1969), 
                                                 
6 Research and development expenses that are missing in COMPUSTAT are considered zero, because the 
accounting rule (SFAS 2) requires firms to report such expenses separately. Consequently, firms that do not report 
R&D expenses are firms that do not spend a material amount on R&D. 
7 There is no accounting rule mandating the disclosure of advertising expense; thus, firms report advertising expense 
in their financial statements on a voluntary basis. Consequently, assuming that firms that do not report advertising 
expense have zero advertising expense could understate the effect of advertising expense for the overall sample. Our 
results are qualitatively similar when we drop advertising from the specifications. 
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a few points are worth noting. First, equations (1) and (2) are specified in terms of first 
differences. We use first differences to mitigate concerns about autocorrelation resulting from 
panel data estimation (see Anderson and Hsiao, 1982).8  Second, Granger causality tests 
generally include lagged values of the dependant variable in the specification and investigate 
whether prior independent variables provide information over and above that provided by prior 
values of the dependent variable. We incorporate lagged values of the dependent variables in 
subsequent specifications. 
 Table 2, Panels A and B, provide the results of estimating equations (1) and (2), 
respectively. We estimate these equations using the generalized least-squares estimation 
technique to address the potential overstatement of the t-statistic due to serially-correlated errors9 
Specifically, we allow for the error terms to be serially correlated and firm-specific, i.e., we 
compute the robust variance–covariance matrix estimates by firm-clusters (see Arellano, 1987, 
1989 and Woolridge, 2002 equation 10.59). Panel A indicates that the coefficient estimates on 
prior-year growth in gifts and two-years-back growth in gifts are 0.05 and 0.02, respectively, 
both of which are statistically significant at the 0.00 and 0.02 levels. This provides an initial 
indication that gifts Granger-cause sales.10 Correspondingly, the coefficient estimates on prior-
year growth in sales and two-years-back growth in sales reported in Panel B are 0.46 and 0.09. 
The coefficient on prior-year sales growth is statistically significant (0.04 level), while the 
coefficient on two-years-back growth in sales is insignificant. Thus, preliminary results provide 
mixed evidence of whether sales Granger-cause gifts. 
                                                 
8 For example, Granger causality tests for macroeconomic studies use the levels of the savings rate on the money 
supply for a specific country. Hence, they do not deal with panel data with potential firm-fixed effects. 
9 Results for this and subsequent tests are qualitatively similar when we estimate the empirical models using OLS. 
10 Neither the Granger causality test nor any other empirical test can definitively establish cause and effect.  Thus, 
similar to prior research, we use the term ‘Granger-cause’ to indicate that one time series is useful in forecasting 
another. 
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Controlling for Sales Drivers 
 This section addresses the concern of a spurious correlation between giving and sales due 
to correlated omitted variables. The relationship of prior GIFT with current SALE could be due 
to GIFT being correlated with other fundamental variables that generate sales.  We therefore 
control for four major corporate activities aimed at enhancing sales: research and development, 
capital expenditures, advertising and promotion, and mergers and acquisitions.  Also, as 
mentioned earlier, the lagged values of the dependent variables are included as independent 
variables in accordance with typical Granger causality tests.11 We estimate the following 
equations: 
log(SALEit/SALEi(t–1))  = a0  + a1log(GIFTi(t–1)/GIFTi(t–2)) + a2log(GIFTi(t–2)/GIFTi(t–3))  
+ a3log(SALEi(t–1)/SALEi(t–2)) + a4log(SALEi(t–2)/SALEi(t–3)) 
+ a5log(RDi(t–1)/RDi(t–2)) + a6log(RDi(t–2)/RDi(t–3)) 
+ a7log(CEXi(t–1)/CEXi(t–2)) + a8log(CEXi(t–2)/CEXi(t–3)) 
+ a9log(ADVTi(t–1)/ADVTi(t–2)) + a10log(ADVTi(t–2)/ADVTi(t–3)) 
+ a11MERGER + a12log(MVi(t–1)) + error  (3) 
 
log(GIFTit/GIFTi(t–1))  = a0  + b1log(GIFTi(t–1)/GIFTi(t–2)) + b2log(GIFTi(t–2)/GIFTi(t–3))  
+ b3log(SALEi(t–1)/SALEi(t–2)) + b4log(SALEi(t–2)/SALEi(t–3)) 
+ b5log(RDi(t–1)/RDi(t–2)) + b6log(RDi(t–2)/RDi(t–3)) 
+ b7log(CEXi(t–1)/CEXi(t–2)) + b8log(CEXi(t–2)/CEXi(t–3)) 
+ b9log(ADVTi(t–1)/ADVTi(t–2)) + b10log(ADVTi(t–2)/ADVTi(t–3)) 
+ b11MERGER + b12 MTRi(t–1) + b14log(MVi(t–1))  + error  (4) 
 
where RD is annual research and development expense (data item #46 in COMPUTSTAT); CEX 
is the capital expenditure (data item #128); ADVT is advertising expense (data item #45); 
MERGER is an indicator variable that equals one if a merger or acquisition is indicated in the 
COMPUSTAT footnote code AFTNT #1 and zero otherwise; MV is market value of equity 
computed as the product of stock price (data item #199) and number of shares outstanding (data 
                                                 
11 However, Anderson and Hsiao (1981) show that, when using first differences in panel data for mitigating firm-
fixed effects, the errors can be correlated with lagged values of the dependent variables. They suggest using an 
instrument variable approach to alleviate this concern (also see Judson and Owen, 1996). The fundamental factors 
such as R&D outlays are such instruments that help alleviate the correlation of errors with the lagged values of the 
dependant variable. 
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item #25) and controls for size differences; MTR is the marginal tax rate; and the subscripts 
denote firm i in year j. 
 In addition to prior sales and lagged gifts, equation (4) includes possible drivers of 
current giving.  McWilliams and Siegel (2000) note that previous tests of the association 
between CSR and financial performance are misspecified because studies omit research and 
development.  They suggest that research and development and CSR are positively correlated, 
since aspects of CSR can create innovation (e.g., Russo and Fouts, 1997).12  Thus, we include 
research and development and capital expenditures. In addition, as noted earlier, prior research 
has found a positive association between advertising and giving. Finally, the firm’s marginal tax 
rate will affect the timing of charitable contributions, as firms prefer to make contributions in 
years when they face high tax rates (Clotfelter, 1985). 
 The left three columns in Table 3, Panels A and B, provide estimates of equations (3) and 
(4), respectively, for the full sample.  In Panel A, the control/instrumental variables RD, CEX, 
MERGER, and MV (size) are, as expected, positively associated with future sales growth. The 
variable ADVT is not associated with future sales growth, possibly due to data on advertisement 
being missing for a large number of observations.  The coefficient on prior-year growth in gifts 
is 0.03, and the coefficient on two-years-back growth in gifts is 0.02. Notably, the coefficient on 
prior-year gift growth is statistically significant (0.01 level), and the coefficient on two-years-
back growth in giving is marginally significant (0.08 level). Thus, even after controlling for the 
major sales drivers, our results continue to indicate that corporate contributions Granger-cause 
sales. We estimate that a one-percent growth in giving in each of the preceding two years 
                                                 
12 When McWilliams and Siegel (2000) include R&D in a regression of financial performance on KLD ratings data, 
they find no association between CSR and financial performance. 
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contributes on average roughly 7 basis points (0.07%) toward the growth in sales.13 Note that the 
sum of the coefficients (elasticities) in equation (3) are less than one which indicates that sales 
growth occurs under decreasing returns to scale relative to contribution growth. 
 In Table 3, Panel B, the coefficient on prior-year growth in sales is 0.39, and the 
coefficient on two-years-back growth in sales is 0.16. The coefficient on prior-year sales growth 
is marginally significant (0.08 level), while the coefficient on two-years-back growth in sales is 
insignificant. The coefficients on size and the marginal tax rate are statistically significant. Thus, 
after controlling for other possible drivers of corporate giving, we find only very weak evidence 
consistent with an association between prior sales and current giving.14 
Controlling for Management Quality and Expected Sales Growth 
 As noted in Section I, it is important to control for the quality of management in 
examining the relation between CSR and economic performance, as effective managers could be 
able to increase social and financial performance simultaneously.15  We use “organization 
capital” as a proxy for managerial quality. Organization capital is the synthesis of the systems, 
processes, and organizational designs of a business that can not be completely transferred to 
other organizations or imitated by them.16  Such systems and processes include product design 
systems, marketing techniques, personnel management, project selection, and financing 
mechanisms, all evolving from the management of an enterprise.  Lev and Radhakrishnan (2005) 
                                                 
13 This estimate is the difference between the predicted sales growth using growth in gifts pegged at one percent and 
the predicted sales growth with no growth in gifts. The mean of all explanatory variables other than giving is used to 
derive the predicted sales growth. 
14 The giving measure includes both cash and product contributions.  It is possible that firms make cash gifts when 
they have the capacity, or liquidity, to give. In untabulated tests, results are qualitatively similar when we include a 
control for liquidity (cash divided by sales or net current assets divided by sales) in the estimations of Equation 4.  
15 Waddock and Graves (1997) find a link between social performance and the quality of management, where 
quality of management is defined using the Fortune reputation survey rankings. However, Fryxell and Wang (1994) 
note that the reputation measure is biased by a financial performance “halo.” 
16 Evenson and Westphal (1995) define organization capital as “…the knowledge used to combine human skills and 
physical capital into systems for producing and delivering want-satisfying products.” 
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develop a measure of organization capital and validate it by showing that it constitutes a major 
portion of corporate capital market value and is correlated with earnings growth.  This measure  
is based on the notion that organization capital contributes to the abnormal sales generating 
capability of an organization when compared to peers. The organization capital measure thus is a 
measure of management quality. Accordingly, we incorporate organization capital for firm i in 
year t, OCit (as measured by Lev and Radhakrishnan, 2005), in our analysis to distinguish the 
effect of managerial quality from the effect of charitable contributions growth on sales growth. 
The middle three columns of Table 3, Panel A, provides results from estimating equation 
(3) for the full sample with organization capital as an additional control variable. This proxy for 
management quality is indeed strongly associated with future sales. However, the coefficient on 
prior-year growth in gifts (0.03) and the coefficient on two-years-prior growth in gifts (0.02) are 
both statistical significant, even more so than without organization capital. Thus, after 
controlling for managerial quality, our results still indicate that gifts Granger-cause sales. The 
results from estimating equation (4) including organization capital are provided in the middle 
columns of Table 3, Panel B.  Interestingly, the coefficient on organizational capital in predicting 
giving is negative and marginally significant.  The coefficient on prior-year sales (0.45) is again 
only marginally significant. 
 Another possible explanation for our results is that managers decide how much to 
contribute toward charitable causes based on their expectation of future sales and earnings 
growth.  If the decision of GIFT is indeed affected by the manager’s growth expectations, then 
our findings are due to the way in which managers make decisions about charitable 
contributions, rather than the inherent effect of contributions on business growth.  Because 
giving in advance of actual economic performance would be risky if giving did not provide some 
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benefit, it is unlikely that managers make giving decisions in this manner.  Nevertheless, to 
accommodate this possibility, we include in the regressions an indicator of a company’s expected 
growth—its market-to-book ratio.  This is the ratio of the forward-looking capital market value 
of the company to its historical book value (net assets on the balance sheet).  The measure 
indicates the aggregate investor expectations of future company growth and has been shown in 
previous research to be a successful predictor of firm growth (e.g., Fama and French, 1995). 
We incorporate the market-to-book ratio into equation (3) and equation (4), along with 
organization capital as control variables for predicting future sales. The results from estimating 
these equations are provided in the three right-hand columns of Table 3, Panels A and B. The 
market-to-book ratio is indeed a powerful indicator of future growth in both sales and charitable 
giving. However, controlling for expected growth does not alter the previous inferences 
concerning the relation between giving and revenue.  When predicting sales growth, the 
coefficients on prior-year growth in gifts and two-years-prior growth in gifts are both statistically 
significant.  On the other hand, when predicting contribution growth, the prior-year sales growth 
is only marginally significant. Overall, the results in Table 3 provide strong evidence that growth 
in charitable contributions is associated with subsequent sales growth.  On the other hand, there 
is only weak evidence that growth in sales is associated with subsequent increases in giving. 
Sensitivity to Public Perception 
The next test provides further evidence on the relation between corporate contributions 
and revenue by focusing on the product market incentive to appear charitable.  As noted in 
Section II, corporate philanthropy can increase name recognition and goodwill among 
consumers, ultimately building demand for a firm’s products.  Firms that produce goods and 
services purchased by individual consumers are more likely to enhance revenue from having a 
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reputation as a good corporate citizen than firms that produce goods and services for industrial or 
governmental use. As such, firms with high direct contact with individual consumers have a 
greater incentive to appear philanthropic for the purpose of boosting revenue. We predict that 
consumer-oriented firms will be more effective at enhancing sales using their corporate giving. 
To test directly this conjecture, we focus on sectors that are highly sensitive to public 
perception, that is, sectors where the customer is the individual consumer, such as retailers, 
financial services, and consumer product manufacturers.  For these sectors, corporate reputation 
should be most elastic (reactive) to corporate contributions.  Specifically we classify firms in the 
“Consumer Goods” and “Finance” industries, as defined by Sharpe (1982), as having high 
sensitivity to consumer perception.  Firms in all other industries are classified as having low 
sensitivity to consumer perception. This classification results in 126 firms (841 observations) in 
the high consumer sensitivity category and 125 firms (777 observations) in the low consumer 
sensitivity category. Thus, just slightly over half of the sample is considered to have a significant 
customer base of individual consumers. 
We estimate equations (1) and (2) for firms with high and low sensitivity to public 
perception separately. The expectation here is that gifts Granger-cause sales for firms that have 
greater product market incentives to give, but not for firms that produce goods primarily for 
industrial use. As reported in Table 4, Panel A, the coefficient estimates on prior-year growth in 
gifts and two-years-back growth in gifts for high consumer sensitivity firms are 0.05 and 0.03, 
respectively, both of which are highly significant. The coefficient estimates on prior-year growth 
in gifts and two-years-back growth in gifts for low consumer sensitivity firms are 0.04 and 0.02, 
respectively, and only prior-year growth in gifts is marginally significant.  These results suggest 
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that firms with high direct contact with individual consumers drive our finding from Table 3 that 
gifts Granger-cause sales. 
On the other hand, as reported in Table 4, Panel B, the coefficient estimates on prior-year 
growth in sales and two-years-back growth in sales in predicting giving growth are 0.19 and 
0.24, respectively, for high consumer sensitivity firms.  Neither of these coefficients is 
statistically significant.  The coefficient estimates on prior-year growth in sales and two-years-
back growth in sales are 0.72 and –0.05, respectively, for low consumer sensitivity firms. The 
coefficient on prior-year sales is statistically significant. Thus, the possibility that sales Granger-
cause gifts appears limited to firms that are less sensitive to consumer perception. 
 Table 4, Panels C and D, provide results from the estimation of equations (3) and (4) for 
firms with high and low sensitivity to public perception separately. In Panel C, the coefficient 
estimates on prior-year growth in gifts and two-years-back growth in gifts for high consumer 
sensitivity firms are 0.04 and 0.02, respectively, which are significant at the 0.01 and 0.07 levels.  
However, the coefficient estimates on prior-year growth in gifts and two-years-back growth in 
gifts for low consumer sensitivity firms, 0.02 and 0.01, respectively, are not significant.  The 
results for both high consumer sensitivity and low consumer sensitivity firms remain unchanged 
when controls are included for managerial quality and expected growth, as reported in Table 4, 
Panel C.  We estimate that the proportion of actual revenue growth explained by charitable 
contributions is 0.32% on average for consumer sensitive firms. Overall, this evidence is 
consistent with our prediction that firms with a product market incentive to have a charitable 
reputation use giving to enhance revenue.  After controlling for other determinants of sales 
growth, there is no evidence that firms that are less sensitive to public perception use 
contributions to grow sales. 
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 Table 4, Panel D, reports that the coefficient estimates on the lagged log(SALEt–1/SALEt–
2) and log(SALEt–2/SALEt–3) for high consumer sensitivity firms are 0.26 and 0.48, respectively, 
which are not significant.  For low consumer sensitivity firms, the coefficient estimates on 
log(SALEt–1/SALEt–2) and log(SALEt–2/SALEt–3) are 0.48 and –0.019. Prior-year growth in sales 
is marginally significant in predicting growth in charitable giving for firms with low sensitive to 
public perception.  The results for both types of firms are similar when controls for managerial 
quality and expected growth are included in the estimation, as reported in Table 4, Panel D. 
Thus, there is no evidence that sales Granger-cause growth in giving for consumer-oriented firms 
and only weak evidence that sales Granger-cause growth in giving for other firms. 
 It is important to note that the focus of this study was on the relation between revenue 
and corporate philanthropy. The evidence that indicates that gifts from firms with low sensitivity 
to public perception do not increase sales does not imply that these firms are not using their 
charitable contribution programs in a profit-maximizing way. Even though these firms do not 
receive a boost in revenue, corporate philanthropy might benefit them in other ways (educating 
workforce, negotiating with regulators, etc.) Overall, the results in Table 4 reinforce the 
importance of examining incentives for engaging in CSR on an industry-level. 
 
V. Concluding Remarks 
 A key question concerning CSR activities is whether they enhance traditional corporate 
goals, such as profit maximization and shareholder value creation, or whether such activities, 
while doing good, consume resources without adequate return.  Much of the debate about the 
legitimacy of and justification for CSR would be settled if it is convincingly shown that such 
activities further traditional business goals.  In this study we provide such evidence.  Using a 
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large sample of charitable contributions made by U.S. public companies, and a statistical 
methodology that distinguishes causation from association, we document that such contributions 
enhance the future sales growth of donors—a prime objective of business enterprises. 
 The finding that corporate gifts contribute to subsequent sales growth is incremental to 
the traditional drivers of growth: capital expenditures, R&D, advertising, and corporate 
acquisitions. In particular, corporate charitable contributions are effective in enhancing revenues 
in the “consumer sectors,” such as retailers and financial services.  In sectors where the customer 
is not an individual, corporate contributions do not appear to enhance future sales.  We also 
examine the impact of “managerial quality,” and find that, while it contributes considerably to 
sales growth, it does not subsume the effect of corporate giving on sales growth. While we find 
only weak evidence consistent with sales growth spurring increased giving, we do not 
definitively rule out the possibility that there is a simultaneous relationship, or “virtuous circle” 
(Waddock and Graves, 1997b), between corporate contributions and revenue.   
 Several important questions remain to be addressed by future studies.  We have shown 
that corporate charitable contributions affect, on average, future sales growth, but is the current 
level of giving optimal, suboptimal, or excessive?  In addition, further research is needed to 
investigate other mechanisms by which corporate philanthropy can give firms a competitive 
advantage (i.e., spurring innovation, improving labor force, influencing legislators and 
regulators) and to examine the effectiveness of different types of philanthropy programs (e.g., 
product giving, volunteering).  Finally, it is important to gain an understanding of how corporate 
giving interacts with firms’ other CSR activities and whether corporate giving does, indeed, 
achieve the desired social impact. 
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Table 1: Sample Description 
 
 
Panel A: Industry Representation 
Firms Observations 
 Industry Number Percentage Number Percentage 
1 Basic Industries 26 10.36 166 10.26 
2 Capital Goods 39 15.54 258 15.95 
3 Construction 7 2.79 42 2.60 
4 Consumer Goods 96 38.25 623 38.50 
5 Energy 8 3.19 49 3.03 
6 Finance 33 13.15 218 13.47 
7 Transportation 15 5.98 86 5.32 
8 Utilities 26 10.36 172 10.63 
9 Other 1 0.40 4 0.25 
 TOTAL 251 100.00 1,618 100.00 
 
 
Panel B: Year Representation 
Observations 
 Year Number Percentage 
 1992 147 9.09 
 1993 169 10.44 
 1994 188 11.62 
 1995 204 12.61 
 1996 200 12.36 
 1997 212 13.10 
 1998 197 12.18 
 1999 169 10.44 
 2000 132 8.16 
 TOTAL 1,618 100.00 
 
Industry classifications are based on Sharpe (1982). The following 4-digit SIC codes are assigned to each group.   
(1) basic industries: 1000–1299, 1400–1499, 2600–2699, 2800–2829, 2870–2899, 3300–3399; (2) capital goods: 
3400–3419, 3440–3599, 3670–3699, 3800–3849, 5080–5089, 5100–5129, 7300–7399; (3) construction: 1500–1599, 
2400–2499, 3220–3299, 3430–3439, 5160–5219; (4) consumer goods: 0000–0999, 2000–2399, 2500–2599, 2700–
2799, 2830–2869, 3000–3219, 3420–3429, 3600–3669, 3700–3719, 3850–3879, 3880–3999, 4830–4899, 5000–
5079, 5090–5099, 5130–5159, 5220–5999, 7000–7299, 7400–9999; (5) energy: 1300–1399, 2900–2999; (6) 
finance: 6000–6999; (7) transportation: 3720–3799, 4000–4799; (8) utilities: 4800–4829, 4900–4999; (9) others: all 
other SIC codes. 
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Table 1: Sample Description (cont’d) 
 
 
Panel C: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable N 
 
Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
 
Min. 
First 
quartile 
 
Median 
Third 
quartile 
 
Max. 
SALE  
($ millions) 1,618 8,911 15,224 84 1,402 3,592 10,314 165,013 
GIFT  
($ millions) 1,618 8.93 21.54 0.003 0.82 1.99 6.17 256.90 
(SALEt/ 
SALEt-1) – 1 
(%) 1,618 7.87 11.33 -50.60 1.57 6.64 12.97 242.12 
(GIFTt/ 
GIFTt-1) – 1 
(%) 1,618 4.26 14.06 -98.83 -6.45 4.46 17.40 4940.04 
RD  
($ millions) 1,618 247 696 0 0 7 106 6,822 
CEX  
($ millions) 1,618 682 1,441 0 38 159 634 15,525 
ADVT  
($ millions) 495 473 654 1 52 183 658 3,704 
NI  
($ millions) 1,618 558 1,184 -8,101 56 192 645 10,717 
MV  
($ millions) 1,618 14,580 35,903 25 1,340 4,018 11,802 512,832 
OC  
($ millions) 1,618 1,577 3,207 0 174 511 1,678 44,878 
MB 1,618 3.54 4.01 0.03 1.69 2.46 3.89 81.92 
MTR (%) 1,618 28 13 0 33 35 35 38 
MERGER 1,618 0.17 0.38      
         
 
Variable definitions: SALE = annual revenue (data item #12); GIFT = direct corporate giving + corporate 
foundation giving; RD = research and development (data item #46 or zero if data item #46 is missing); CEX = 
capital expenditures (data item #128); ADVT = advertising (data item #45); NI = net income before extraordinary 
items (data item #18); MV = market value (data item #199 × data item #125); OC = organization capital from Lev 
and Radhakrishnan (2005); MB  =  market-to-book ratio ((data item #199)/(data item #60)); MTR = marginal tax 
rate from Graham (1996a, 1996b), and MERGER equals 1 if AFTNT1 indicates a merger or acquisition and 0 
otherwise. 
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Table 2: Gifts and Sales, Preliminary Analysis for Causality 
 
 
Panel A: Equation (1) for full sample (n = 1,618) 
 Dependant variable = log(SALEt/ SALEt–1)  
 Coefficient t-statistic P 
log(GIFTt–1/GIFTt–2)  0.05 3.60 0.00 
log(GIFTt–2/GIFTt–3)  0.02 2.31 0.02 
Adj. R2 1.68% 
 
 
Panel B: Equation (2) for full sample (n = 1,618) 
 Dependant variable = log(GIFTt/ GIFTt–1)  
 Coefficient t-statistic P 
log(SALEt–1/SALEt–2)  0.46 2.11 0.04 
log(SALEt–2/SALEt–3)  0.09 0.52 0.60 
Adj. R2 0.52% 
 
 
See Table 1 for variable definitions.  
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Table 3: Gifts and Sales, Granger Causality for Full Sample 
 
 
Panel A: Equation (3) for full sample (n =1,618); dependent variable = log(SALEt/SALEt–1). 
 Equation (3) as written With Organizational Capital With Market-to-Book Ratio 
 Coeff. t-stat P Coeff. t-stat P Coeff. t-stat P 
log(GIFTt–1/GIFTt–2)  0.03 2.79 0.01 0.03 3.18 0.00 0.03 3.07 0.00 
log(GIFTt–2/GIFTt–3)  0.02 1.77 0.08 0.02 2.20 0.03 0.02 2.06 0.04 
log(SALEt–1/SALEt–2) 0.39 6.65 0.00 0.32 5.28 0.00 0.27 4.37 0.00 
log(SALEt–2/SALEt–3) –0.08 –1.39 0.16 –0.12 –2.21 0.03 –0.16 –3.01 0.00 
log(RDt–1/RDt–2)  0.04 2.00 0.05 0.05 2.28 0.02 0.05 2.32 0.02 
log(RDt–2/RDt–3) 0.01 1.43 0.15 0.02 1.96 0.05 0.02 1.92 0.06 
log(CEXt–1/CEXt–2)  0.02 2.54 0.01 0.02 2.62 0.00 0.02 2.64 0.01 
log(CEXt–2/CEXt–3) 0.01 0.24 0.81 –0.01 –0.06 0.95 –0.01 –0.14 0.89 
log(ADVTt–1/ADVTt–2)  0.01 0.47 0.64 0.01 0.12 0.90 –0.01 –0.08 0.93 
log(ADVTt–2/ADVTt–3) 0.02 0.98 0.33 0.01 0.35 0.72 0.00 0.03 0.97 
MERGERt–1 0.05 6.16 0.00 0.05 6.15 0.00 0.04 5.91 0.00 
log(MVt–1) 0.01 4.06 0.00 –0.01 –2.34 0.02 –0.02 –4.60 0.00 
log(OCt–1)    0.02 5.65 0.00 0.03 7.12 0.00 
log(MBt–1)       0.03 4.58 0.00 
Adj R2 14.72% 17.40% 19.09% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 31
Table 3: Gifts and Future Sales, Granger Causality for Full Sample (cont’d) 
 
 
Panel B: Equation (4) for full sample (n =1,618); dependent variable = log(GIFTt/GIFTt–1). 
 Equation (4) as written With Organizational Capital With Market-to-Book Ratio 
 Coeff. t-stat P Coeff. t-stat P Coeff. t-stat P 
log(GIFTt–1/GIFTt–2)  –0.22 –3.40 0.00 –0.22 –3.45 0.00 –0.23 –3.50 0.00 
log(GIFTt–2/GIFTt–3)  –0.01 –0.21 0.83 –0.02 –0.27 0.78 –0.01 –0.19 0.84 
log(SALEt–1/SALEt–2) 0.39 1.74 0.08 0.45 1.92 0.06 0.41 1.77 0.08 
log(SALEt–2/SALEt–3) 0.16 0.99 0.32 0.21 1.27 0.21 0.14 0.79 0.43 
log(RDt–1/RDt–2)  0.04 0.56 0.57 0.03 0.50 0.62 0.03 0.44 0.66 
log(RDt–2/RDt–3) 0.04 1.63 0.10 0.04 1.59 0.11 0.04 1.53 0.13 
log(CEXt–1/CEXt–2)  0.03 1.07 0.28 0.03 1.09 0.28 0.03 1.04 0.30 
log(CEXt–2/CEXt–3) 0.04 1.62 0.11 0.04 1.68 0.09 0.04 1.66 0.10 
log(ADVTt–1/ADVTt–2)  0.03 0.32 0.75 0.04 0.39 0.69 0.05 0.45 0.65 
log(ADVTt–2/ADVTt–3) –0.11 –0.79 0.43 –0.10 –0.72 0.47 –0.11 –0.77 0.44 
MERGERt–1 0.02 0.73 0.46 0.02 0.76 0.44 0.01 0.57 0.57 
MTRt–1 0.20 2.67 0.01 0.19 2.61 0.01 0.16 2.08 0.04 
log(MVt–1) 0.03 4.30 0.00 0.04 4.12 0.00 0.02 2.10 0.04 
log(OCt–1)    –0.02 –1.98 0.05 –0.01 –0.81 0.41 
log(MBt–1)       0.04 2.06 0.04 
Adj R2 5.25% 5.44% 5.94% 
 
See Table 1 for variable definitions. 
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Table 4: Gifts and Future Sales, Granger Causality by Sensitivity to Public Perception 
 
 
Panel A: Equation (1) by sensitivity to public perception; dependent variable = log(SALEt/SALEt–1). 
 High Consumer Sensitivity (n = 841) Low Consumer Sensitivity (n = 777) 
 Coefficient t-statistic P Coefficient t-statistic P 
log(GIFTt–1/GIFTt–2) 0.05 3.61 0.00 0.04 1.85 0.06 
log(GIFTt–2/GIFTt–3) 0.03 2.58 0.01 0.02 0.88 0.38 
Adj. R2 2.58% 1.06% 
 
 
Panel B: Equation (2) by sensitivity to public perception; dependent variable = log(GIFTt/GIFTt–1). 
 High Consumer Sensitivity (n = 841) Low Consumer Sensitivity (n=777) 
 Coefficient t-statistic P Coefficient t-statistic P 
log(SALEt–1/SALEt–2) 0.19 0.54 0.58 0.72 2.81 0.00 
log(SALEt–2/SALEt–3) 0.24 0.95 0.35 –0.05 –0.23 0.82 
Adj. R2 0.17% 1.82% 
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Table 4: Gifts and Future Sales, Granger Causality by Sensitivity to Public Perception (cont’d) 
 
 
Panel C: Equation (3) by sensitivity to public perception; dependent variable = log(SALEt/SALEt–1). 
 
High Consumer Sensitivity 
(n = 841) 
Low Consumer Sensitivity 
(n = 777) 
High Consumer Sensitivity 
(n = 841) 
Low Consumer Sensitivity 
(n = 777) 
 Coeff. t-stat P Coeff. t-stat P Coeff. t-stat P Coeff. t-stat P 
log(GIFTt–1/GIFTt–2)  0.04 2.75 0.01 0.02 1.16 0.25 0.04 2.78 0.01 0.02 1.09 0.28 
log(GIFTt–2/GIFTt–3)  0.02 1.83 0.07 0.01 0.84 0.40 0.02 1.83 0.07 0.01 0.84 0.40 
log(SALEt–1/SALEt–2) 0.37 5.08 0.00 0.29 3.29 0.00 0.29 3.94 0.00 0.14 1.44 0.15 
log(SALEt–2/SALEt–3) –0.02 –0.24 0.81 –0.15 –1.91 0.06 –0.08 –1.04 0.29 –0.26 –3.47 0.00 
log(RDt–1/RDt–2)  0.04 1.28 0.20 0.05 2.45 0.02 0.04 1.55 0.12 0.05 2.46 0.02 
log(RDt–2/RDt–3) 0.01 0.45 0.65 0.02 1.59 0.11 0.01 0.94 0.34 0.02 1.51 0.13 
log(CEXt–1/CEXt–2)  0.01 1.11 0.26 0.08 4.25 0.00 0.01 1.16 0.24 0.08 4.44 0.00 
log(CEXt–2/CEXt–3) 0.01 0.15 0.88 0.01 0.81 0.42 –0.01 –1.69 0.09 0.01 0.43 0.66 
log(ADVTt–1/ADVTt–2)  –0.03 –1.14 0.25 0.07 1.35 0.18 –0.04 –1.61 0.11 0.06 1.08 0.28 
log(ADVTt–2/ADVTt–3) –0.02 –0.86 0.39 0.07 2.10 0.04 –0.04 –2.23 0.03 0.06 1.42 0.15 
MERGERt–1 0.04 3.33 0.00 0.06 4.89 0.00 0.04 3.32 0.00 0.05 4.45 0.00 
log(MVt–1) 0.01 3.50 0.00 0.01 1.99 0.05 0.03 4.50 0.00 -0.02 -4.27 0.00 
log(OCt–1)       0.01 1.43 0.16 0.03 5.35 0.00 
log(MBt–1)       0.04 2.78 0.01 0.05 5.44 0.00 
Adj R2 12.88% 20.96% 16.40% 27.31% 
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Table 4: Gifts and Future Sales, Granger Causality by Sensitivity to Public Perception (cont’d) 
 
 
Panel D: Equation (4) by sensitivity to public perception; dependent variable = log(GIFTt/GIFTt–1). 
 
High Consumer Sensitivity 
(n = 841) 
Low Consumer Sensitivity 
(n = 777) 
High Consumer Sensitivity 
(n = 841) 
Low Consumer Sensitivity 
(n = 777) 
 Coeff. t-stat P Coeff. t-stat P Coeff. t-stat P Coeff. t-stat P 
log(GIFTt–1/GIFTt–2)  -0.21 -1.93 0.06 -0.24 -4.19 0.00 -0.21 -1.93 0.06 -0.27 -4.51 0.00 
log(GIFTt–2/GIFTt–3)  -0.07 -0.76 0.44 0.03 0.43 0.67 -0.07 -0.76 0.44 0.01 0.05 0.96 
log(SALEt–1/SALEt–2) 0.26 0.73 0.47 0.48 1.78 0.08 0.30 0.89 0.37 0.39 2.00 0.04 
log(SALEt–2/SALEt–3) 0.48 1.59 0.11 -0.19 -0.92 0.36 0.53 1.68 0.10 -0.27 -1.26 0.21 
log(RDt–1/RDt–2)  -0.18 -1.01 0.31 0.12 2.62 0.01 -0.18 -1.01 0.31 0.09 2.23 0.03 
log(RDt–2/RDt–3) -0.01 -0.20 0.84 0.06 2.21 0.03 -0.01 -0.22 0.82 0.04 1.87 0.06 
log(CEXt–1/CEXt–2)  0.03 1.28 0.20 -0.01 -0.16 0.87 0.03 1.29 0.20 -0.01 -0.18 0.85 
log(CEXt–2/CEXt–3) 0.02 0.66 0.51 0.10 2.67 0.01 0.02 0.69 0.50 0.10 2.84 0.01 
log(ADVTt–1/ADVTt–2)  -0.06 -0.51 0.61 0.07 0.47 0.64 -0.06 -0.46 0.64 0.08 0.54 0.59 
log(ADVTt–2/ADVTt–3) -0.33 -1.69 0.09 0.19 1.69 0.09 -0.32 -1.65 0.10 0.18 1.68 0.10 
MERGERt–1 0.04 0.97 0.33 0.01 0.09 0.92 0.03 0.94 0.35 -0.01 -0.15 0.88 
MTRt–1 0.11 0.83 0.41 0.25 2.53 0.01 0.10 0.80 0.42 0.23 2.46 0.02 
log(MVt–1) 0.03 2.77 0.01 0.02 3.48 0.00 0.04 1.89 0.06 0.01 0.77 0.44 
log(OCt–1)       -0.01 -0.84 0.40 -0.01 -0.14 0.88 
log(MBt–1)       -0.01 -0.34 0.74 0.10 3.56 0.00 
Adj R2 4.81% 12.04% 4.87% 14.72% 
 
See Table 1 for variable definitions. High consumer sensitivity includes consumer goods and finance industries as defined by Sharpe (1982); Low consumer 
sensitivity includes all other industries. 
 
